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MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
VARIATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES
Ch. 14 Insanity Defense

Paul H. Robinson
Tyler Scot Williams
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14. INSANITY DEFENSE
The thirty‐year‐old defendant has only recently been deinstitutionalized to live
with his parents, with the aid of medication that controls his apparently overwhelming
impulses to engage in random conduct that he neither wants nor understands. Normally
passive and retiring, when he is not fully medicated he sometimes feels compelled to do
things that injure himself – once putting his hand into a spinning machine, permanently
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losing the end of his fingers – or injure others – he once strangled to death for no
apparent reason a neighborhood dog that he liked. Within the last year, however,
doctors have found a combination of drugs that seem to effectively control his random
impulses.
Today he is waiting on the platform for the subway train that will take him to the
rehabilitation center where he works each day at a menial job. Unfortunately, his
parents have forgotten to give him his medication this morning. There are several dozen
people on the platform, including a uniformed police officer standing several yards away
from him. As the train pulls into the station, he deliberately pushes a man standing next
to him in front of the train. As the police officer rushes forward and grabs the
defendant, the defendant says, “I pushed that man in front of the train. I think I might
have hurt him badly.” The seriously injured man is pulled from beneath the train and
carried away. The policeman asks defendant why he did it. He replies, “I don’t know.
Whosh, whosh. I just got the idea and I had to do it. I’m so sorry.”1
The criminal law generally commits itself to impose criminal liability and
punishment only on offenders who are morally blameworthy for their conduct. If the
offender’s conduct is the result of serious mental illness, it may undermine that required
blameworthiness. A person who strangles another to death in a hallucination, believing
he is squeezing an orange, simply does not have the kind of moral responsibility for his
conduct that would give rise to sufficient blameworthiness to punish.
But how is the criminal law to define the conditions under which mental disease
or defect can exculpate an offender for an offense? Certainly, there is a significant
portion of the population, some would say a large majority, who have some kind of
mental dysfunction, and many kinds of dysfunctions may make it more difficult for a
person to remain law‐abiding. How does the criminal law draw the line that
distinguishes that small group that is so dysfunctional and dysfunctional in such a way as
to exculpate them for an offense?
The law has come to distinguish two kinds of mental dysfunction. Cognitive
dysfunction occurs when an offender’s mental disease or defect distorts his cognitive
ability to understand his surroundings, the consequences of his conduct, for the criminal
or wrongful nature of his conduct. Control dysfunction occurs when an offender’s
mental disease or defect impairs his ability to control his conduct (which he may very
well know to be criminal and wrongful).
The states may be divided into five categories for the approach they take in
recognizing an offender’s cognitive dysfunction as the basis for an insanity defense, as
presented in the map below.

1

The facts of this hypothetical are similar in many respects to the case of Andrew Goldstein. See People v.
Goldstein, 14 A.D.3d 32, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2004), rev'd, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727 (2005). For a fuller case
narrative, see PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 713‐17 (4th ed., 2016).

1
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A. Defense Abolished
Six states essentially abolish the insanity defense: Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah.2 They are shown in black on the map.
B. Complete Loss of Understanding
Twenty‐eight states, with dark sheeting on the map follow the traditional
common‐law rule in providing an insanity defense where defendant has lost his or her
ability to understand the nature of his or her conduct in some very fundamental way.
This common position is taken in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.3 This
position is commonly referred to as the “M’Naghten test,” from the old English case
2

Idaho Code Ann. § 18‐ 207; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21‐ 5209; State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316 (1984); Finger v. State, 117
Nev. 548 (2001); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1‐ 04.1‐01; Utah Code Ann. § 76‐2‐ 305.
3

Ala. Code § 13A‐3‐1 ; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.47.010 ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐502 ; Cal. Penal Code § 25 ; Colo.

2
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that required that the offender “was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”4
The insanity defenses that exist in these jurisdictions stands in contrast with the
next two groups, which allow the defense even if the defendant’s dysfunction at the
time of the offense is not a complete loss of understanding but rather a “substantial
impairment” of his or her cognitive capacity. However, some of the 28 jurisdictions
leave a little bit of wiggle room by providing defense when the defendant, as a result of
mental disease or defect, was “unable to appreciate” the nature and quality of his
conduct. The word “appreciate” here might give a court and a jury some ability to move
off the demand that the defendant have a total loss of capacity to “know” the nature of
his conduct.5
C. Substantial Impairment – Criminal
The next lighter shade on the table indicates those states that allow a somewhat
broader insanity defense, making it available to defendants who, as noted above, have
only a substantial loss in their cognitive functioning rather than a complete loss. This is
the approach recommended by the Model Penal Code:
Section 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. . . .

Code § 701.4 ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14 ; State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17 (1972); Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d
297 (Miss. 1983); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 552.010 ; State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260 (2011) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4‐ 1 ; State v.
Hartley, 90 N.M. 488 (1977) ; State v. Humphrey, 283 N.C. 570 (1973) ; State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St.2d 13 (1969) ;
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 152; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 315 ; S.C. Code Ann. § 17‐24‐ 10 ; S.D. Codified Laws § 22‐ 1‐2 ;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39‐ 11‐501 ; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01 ; Herbin v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 173 (1998 );
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.12.010 ; State v. Esser, 16 Wis.2d 567 (1962) ; 18 U.S.C. § 17.
4

Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).

5

See, for example, the Alabama formulation of the defense in Code of Alabama § 13A‐3‐1. Mental disease or
defect:
(a)
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16‐8‐101.5 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.027 ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16‐3‐ 2 ; Ind. Code § 35‐41‐3‐ 6 ; Iowa

3
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defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b)
“Severe mental disease or defect” does not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
(c)
evidence.

The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing

Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, and Vermont adopt this
substantial‐impairment approach.4 More specifically, they require that the defendant at
the time of the offense lacks substantial capacity to appreciate “the criminality” of his
conduct.5
D. Substantial Impairment – Wrongful
Another eleven jurisdictions – Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and
Wyoming6 – brings the substantial‐impairment total to seventeen. These jurisdictions
adopt the Model Penal Code’s “lacks substantial capacity” formulation but then adopts
the Code’s bracketed alternative formulation (quote above): the defendant must lack
the substantial capacity to appreciate the “wrongfulness” of their conduct rather than
the “criminality” of their conduct.7
To see how these alternative formulations might have a different effect in
practice, measures situation where the mentally ill defendant believes that God has
directed him to commit the offense. He would continue to fully appreciate that his

4

Ark. Code Ann. § 5‐2‐ 312 ; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/6‐2 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020 ; Md. Code Ann., Crim. P.
§ 3‐109 ; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.295 ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4801.
5

For example, Oregon section 161.295, Mental disease or defect, follows the Model Penal Code formulation:
(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect at the time of
engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they
include any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.

6

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a‐13; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 401; Howard v. United States, 954 A.2d 415 (D.C. 2008) ;
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 704‐ 400; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17‐A, § 39; Com. v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967) ; Mi. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 768.21a ; N.Y. Penal Law § 40.15 ; State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 (1979) ; State v. Parsons, 181 W.Va.
131 (1989 ) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7‐11‐ 304.
7

See, for example, the formulation in Hawaii § 704‐400. Physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect excluding
penal responsibility: “(1) A person is not responsible, under this Code, for conduct if at the time of the conduct as
a result of physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform the person's conduct to the requirements of law.” 10 State
v. Fichera, 153 N.H. 588 (2006).

4
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conduct was “criminal” although his mental illness would also lead him to conclude that
it was not “wrongful” in some larger moral sense. Thus, he would get a defense under
the wrongfulness formulation but not under the criminality formulation.
E. Product of Disease
One jurisdiction, New Hampshire,10 rejects even the Model Penal Code’s
“substantial impairment” limitation on the insanity defense. It requires nothing more
than the fact that the defendant would not have committed the offense but for his or
her mental disease or defect. That is, it is enough that the offense was “the product of”
mental disease.8
In our hypothetical at the beginning of this chapter, the mentally ill man who
pushes another in front of the subway train is suffering from a purely control
dysfunction. He fully understands the criminality and wrongfulness of his conduct. Thus,
he would be ineligible for a defense under a cognitive prong. (He probably would get a

8

“A defendant asserting an insanity defense must prove two elements: first, that at the time he acted, he was
suffering from a mental disease or defect; and, second, that a mental disease or defect caused his actions.” State v.
Fichera, 153 N.H. 588, 593, 903 A.2d 1030, 1034 (2006).

5
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defense under New Hampshire’s “product test.”) If he is to get defense, it can only be
under an insanity defense “control prong” yet, as the map below indicates, twenty‐eight
states – the majority of American jurisdictions – and the federal system do not
recognize control dysfunction as a basis for an insanity defense.
F. No Control Prong
All of the black states on the map have only the cognitive impairment form of the
insanity defense, discussed in the subsections above, or no insanity defense at all. Only
the non‐black states allow an insanity defense where the offender’s dysfunction is a
control problem rather than the cognitive dysfunction. These twenty‐eight states
include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the Federal system.9
(The six states that have abolished the insanity defense, noted in Section A above, also
obviously will not be providing a defense in control‐dysfunction cases.)
As the map illustrates, however, some states go beyond the loss or impairment of
cognitive functioning as a basis for an insanity defense and recognize the loss or
impairment of a person’s ability to control his or her conduct as the potential basis for a
defense.
G. Irresistible Impulse
Three jurisdictions, with medium shading on the map, adopt what have been
called “irresistible impulse” formulations: New Mexico, Ohio, and Virginia.10 This
essentially requires that the defendant at the time of the offense no longer had any
choice with regard to his engaging in the offense conduct. He had lost all ability to
control it.
H. MPC Substantial Impairment
Compare that formulation with the Model Penal Code’s “lacks substantial
capacity” formulation, which is adopted by the thirteen jurisdictions in light shading on

9

See supra note 3; see also Paul H. Robinson et. al., The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, 7 J. Legal
Analysis 77‐79 (2015) (cataloguing jurisdictions that expressly embrace M’Naghten language or are for other
reasons de facto M’Naghten jurisdictions).
10

State v. Hartley, 90 N.M. 488, 490 (1977); State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St.2d 13 (1969); Herbin v. Commonwealth, 28
Va.App. 173, 181‐83 (1998).
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the map: Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.11 Under this approach, the defendant may gain an insanity defense, as long
as the jury concludes that the extent of his impairment of control is sufficient to render
him blameless. Under the language of the Model Penal Code quoted above, he “lacks
Taken
substantial capacity… to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”
together, the three irresistible‐impulse jurisdictions plus the thirteen substantial‐
impairment jurisdictions plus New Hampshire’s product test means that only seventeen
of the fifty‐two American jurisdictions recognize a control prong for the insanity
defense. It is only in these jurisdictions that the mentally‐ill offender in our train station
hypothetical would be eligible for defense.
I. Observations and Speculations
The disagreement that we see among the jurisdictions moves along two
dimensions. On the one hand, jurisdictions disagree about how severe a dysfunction
must be in affecting the offender’s conduct in order to entitle the offender to an excuse.
The M’Naghten test and the irresistible impulse test require complete loss of cognitive
ability and control, respectively. In contrast, the Model Penal Code’s insanity
formulation requires only a “substantial impairment” of the offender’s ability to
appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct or of its ability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
Why do we see the pattern that we see between the complete‐loss states and
the substantial‐impairment states? It may well reflect some general reservation about
how easy or hard it is for the insanity defense to be abused. Studies have shown that,
while there is a common perception that the insanity defense is frequently given – too
frequently given – the reality is that even the substantial‐impairment form is a very
difficult defense for a defendant to obtain.12
Perhaps even more interesting, the evidence suggests that the particular
formulation of the defense given to a jury may make little difference – the academic and
legislative skirmishing on the issue may be all for nothing. There is evidence that, no
matter what instruction a jury is given, its members tend to look to their own shared

11

Model Penal Code § 4.01(1); Ark. Code Ann. § 5‐2‐ 312; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a‐13; Howard v. United States,
954 A.2d 415 (D.C. 2008); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 704‐400; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020; Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 3109;
Com. v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967); Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.21a; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.295; State v.
Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 (1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4801; State v. Parsons, 181 W.Va. 131 (1989); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 7‐11‐ 304.
12
See Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight‐State Study, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334 (1991).
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intuitions of justice in deciding whether a particular defendant’s mental illness in a given
case renders him sufficiently blameless to deserve a defense.13
A second dimension of disagreement among the states is whether to recognize
control dysfunction (of any sort) as an adequate basis for an insanity defense. Recall
that our hypothetical train‐station offender at the beginning of the chapter could not
obtain an insanity defense of any kind in those jurisdictions that have no control prong.
It used to be the case that a majority of states had a control prong. The Model Penal
Code formulation, which has a control prong, was influential in this regard in
encouraging states to adopt it in their new codifications in the 1960s and 1970s. But the
legal landscape changed after the successful insanity defense of John Hinckley for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. By September 1985, 36 states had
reformed their insanity defense, and no fewer than five states dropped the control
prong or repealed the defense altogether.14
Again, the split among the states may reflect different degrees of skepticism
about whether recognition of a control prong promotes abuse of the insanity defense, a
concern highlighted by the Hinckley acquittal. Ironically, Hinckley obtained an insanity
defense probably not because the District of Columbia formulation had a control prong
but rather because the District had an unusual, and probably unwise, rule that put the
burden on the prosecution to disprove the insanity defense rather than on the defense
to prove it.15 A more appropriate legislative reform response would have been to make
clear that the burden of persuasion was on the defendant rather than the government,
rather than in dropping the control prong altogether.
Unlike the disagreement among the states about whether to require a complete
loss versus a substantial impairment – a difference that may in practice have little effect
on juries – the removal of the control prong will have a dramatic practical effect. It
means that in cases where the dysfunction effects control (rather than cognitive
functioning), even a dramatic loss of control – an irresistible impulse – the jury may
never hear about the offender’s mental illness. In states that have only a cognitive
prong, only mental illness producing cognitive dysfunction is relevant under the legal
rules; evidence of control dysfunction, no matter how dramatic the dysfunction, may be
simply irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at trial.

13

See Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors' Personal Conceptions of Insanity and Their
Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 561 (2001) (cataloguing empirical studies that suggest
that jurors "do not apply judicial instruction on legal definitions of insanity," but instead "rely on their own
conceptions of insanity to decide whether a defendant is insane").
14

See Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States‐Post Hinckley, MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITY
L.REP. 54‐59 (1987).
15
See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 63‐64 (1993).
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PREFACE
It is common for criminal law scholars from outside the United States to discuss the
“American rule” and compare it to the rule of other countries.1 As this volume makes clear,
however, there is no such thing as an “American rule.” Each of the states, plus the District of
Columbia and the federal system, have their own criminal law; there are fifty‐two American
criminal codes.
American criminal law scholars know this, of course, but they too commonly speak of
the “general rule” as if it reflects some consensus or near consensus position among the states.
But the truth is that the landscape of American criminal law is one of almost endless diversity,
with few, if any, areas in which there is a consensus or near consensus. Even most American
criminal law scholars seem to fail to appreciate the enormous diversity and disagreement
among the fifty‐two American jurisdictions.
The best one can do in most instances is to talk of a “majority rule,” but even this is
extremely difficult business. Every jurisdiction recognizes a person’s right to defend himself
against unlawful force, for example. But what is the “majority rule” in the United States in the
formulation of that defense? Jurisdictions disagree on a wide variety of issues within
selfdefense, most prominently: (a) What constitutes the “unlawful force” that triggers a right to
use defensive force? (b) What temporal requirement must be met for an actor’s conduct to be
truly “necessary” at that time? (c) What amount of force may be used? (d) When may deadly
force may be employed? (e) When may an initial aggressor claim self‐defense? (f) What is the
legal effect, if any, of the defendant provoking the encounter? (g) What is the legal effect of
mutual combat on self‐defense? (h) Is there a right to resist an unlawful arrest? (i) Is there a
duty to retreat from unlawful aggression before using deadly force?2 There is disagreement
among the states on every one of these issues.3

Further, as some of us have demonstrated elsewhere, even when the research is
done, it is not so easy to construct the majority American rule. To continue with the
selfdefense example above, not only do American jurisdictions disagree on each of the
selfdefense issues listed above, but the pattern of states making up the majority view
on each individual issue varies from issue to issue. In other words, at the end of the day
the “majority rule” for self‐defense in the United States is a rule that no jurisdiction
actually adopts. It is necessarily a composite of the American “majority rule” on each of
the sub‐ issues.4
3

Unfortunately, there has been little work done to map the enormous diversity

among the states, perhaps because it is an extremely burdensome project, in part for
the reasons just noted. Every legal issue requires a major research project investigating
the criminal codes and/or caselaw of all fifty‐two American jurisdictions, and a single
legal doctrine may have a half‐dozen dozen sub‐issues that must each be separately
resolved.
While the paucity of such diversity research is understandable, it is nonetheless
most regrettable, for it is the matters of disagreement that often point to the most
interesting issues for scholars. Why is it that there is disagreement on a particular
point? Why hasn’t a consensus formed? What are the advantages and disadvantages of
the each of the alternative positions such that none have won the day? Or, is it simply
out of ignorance among the legislatures of the alternative positions that has
perpetuated the continuing differences? That is, does diversity exist not because of
genuine disputes about which position is best but rather because there is simply no
debate on the issue because the conflicting positions are not readily known?
The goal of this volume is, first, to raise awareness of the enormous diversity
among the states on issues across the criminal law landscape, to document this diversity
with a host of specific illustrations on a wide range of issues, to encourage criminal law
scholars to investigate these and the many other points of disagreement that exist
among the states, and to encourage legislatures to look to this new diversity scholarship
and to the positions taken by other states when the legislature sets out to codify or
recodify their criminal law (or to encourage judges to do the same in those jurisdictions
that continue to allow judicial criminal law making5).
In each of the next thirty‐two chapters, we examine the different areas of
American criminal law and identify the major groupings among the states on an issue in
each area. This is hardly a comprehensive list of the issues on which there are
disagreement; it is only a representative sampling. Indeed, we know of no area of
American criminal law on which there is not disagreement among the jurisdictions. The
only American criminal law universal is its universal diversity.
Nor are the points of disagreement that we map the only points of diversity
within each of the thirty‐two issues that we examine. On the contrary, we commonly
pick one particular point of disagreement among the states that seems particularly
interesting or important, but it is commonly only one of many points of inter‐state
disagreement on the issue.
For the issue that we take up in each chapter, we group all the American
jurisdictions according to the position they take. However, there is such diversity in
approach that even jurisdictions within the same group commonly take slightly different
approaches (which we generally attempt to document in footnotes). Thus, even our
groupings of states, usually three to seven groups on each issue, understates the extent
of American criminal law diversity.
4

Each chapter provides a map of the United States with each of the states visually
coded according to its approach to the issue. These maps, the reader will see, often
raise interesting hypotheses about geographic or other state factors that might explain
the patterns of agreement and disagreement (red states versus blue states, rural versus
urban, rich versus poor, West Coast versus East Coast, etc.). The last two chapters of the
book illustrate how this mountain of research and the state groupings for each issue can
be used by scholars in many disciplines – including political scientists, criminologists,
criminal law scholars, and sociologists, among others – to investigate alternative
hypotheses about why we see the patterns of agreement and disagreement that we
see.

5

